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ABSTRACT: The mark of a criminal record is clearly harmful for employment. 
However, the reasons for employer aversion are not well established, even 
though legal, policy, and scholarly responses rely upon particular 
explanations. We propose that explanations for aversion often fit under a 
repetition risk framework in which employers use records as neutral sources 
of information about prior illegal activity and make decisions to minimize risk
of similar future conduct. A second explanation is stigma, where the records 
themselves, independent of conduct, trigger stereotypes, status loss, and 
discrimination. Using an experimental employer survey, we find that 
employers evaluate applicants with records more negatively than applicants 
with similar behavior signaled through non-criminal justice sources (e.g., 
social media); this effect remains after accounting for predictions about 
future conduct. It is also most apparent among higher-status jobs rather 
than manual labor, and it persists after adjusting for firm-level and legal 
constraints. We conclude that aversion reflects not only repetition risk but 
also stigma of criminal justice contact. Insofar as criminal record screening is
not exclusively a form of rational risk management, this finding may alter 
assessments of the benefits of screening relative to the costs of 
perpetuating inequality produced by the criminal justice system.
The mark of a criminal record has harmful consequences for hiring, 
and these penalties follow individuals long after formal criminal justice 
sanctions end (e.g., Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2007; Pager, 2003; Pager, 
Western, & Bonikowski, 2009; Uggen, Vuolo, Lageson, Ruhland, & Whitham, 
2014; Western, 2002). These well-known implications—particularly for less-
skilled, low-wage jobs—are profoundly important, given the prevalence of 
records in the United States and their disproportionate concentration among 
racial/ethnic minorities.  As of 2014, states held over 100 million arrest and 
conviction records (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015), corresponding to 
approximately 25% of the U.S. adult population (Jacobs, 2015a), and it is 
estimated that 13% of adult males (and 33% of African American males) 
have felony conviction records (Shannon et al., 2017). Changes in 
information technology also have made it easier for employers to conduct 
background checks. A recent survey found that 73% of human resource 
professionals in the Society for Human Resource Management conduct 
background checks for new hires (Society for Human Resource Management,
2018).  
Employer aversion to records—combined with the concentration of 
criminal justice contact among low-income, less-skilled, racial/ethnic 
minorities—exacerbates racial/ethnic and class disparities in unemployment 
and related domains (e.g., housing, addiction, and reoffending) (Wakefield & 
Uggen, 2010). In response, social justice advocates and legislators have 
promoted policies such as “Ban the Box,” which restricts record screening 
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during initial hiring stages, as well as stronger “Fair Chance” versions that 
specify how records may be used in final decisions. Currently, 35 states (and 
over 150 localities) have enacted some form of Ban the Box (Avery, 2019). 
Concern about the disparate impact of criminal record screening on African 
American and Hispanic men also prompted the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue guidance that federal 
antidiscrimination law limits consideration of records in ways similar to Fair 
Chance policies (2012).  
These legal and policy responses are premised on the notion that 
unregulated criminal record screening can expose people with records to 
unfair treatment and racial discrimination. Emerging scholarship, however, 
also indicates that restricting such screening might actually exacerbate 
overall inequality.  This research finds evidence of statistical discrimination, 
or the use of easy-to-discern characteristics such as race/ethnicity, age, and 
gender to make assumptions about criminal behavior in the absence of 
record information (e.g., Agan & Starr, 2016; Doleac & Hansen, 2016; Vuolo, 
Lageson, & Uggen, 2017). Some critiques of screening restrictions, such as 
Ban the Box, rely on this possibility that employers will engage in illegal 
statistical discrimination that injures racial/ethnic minorities without records, 
if employers cannot access relevant record information (Agan & Starr, 2016; 
Doleac, 2016; Doleac & Hansen, 2016; Jacobs, 2015b; Strahilevitz, 2008).  
A central question in these emergent legal, policy, and scholarly 
debates is why decision makers are averse to records and whether these 
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reasons are relevant to evaluation. Many common explanations focus on the 
risk of future reoffending, and we put forward the term repetition risk to 
describe these explanations.  According to this logic, instrumentally rational 
decision makers seek information about the risk that applicants will, after 
hiring, engage in harmful conduct, including criminal conduct such as 
violence, drug use, or theft; they use criminal records as a source of relevant
information about applicants’ past wrongful conduct on the theory that past 
conduct is predictive of similar future conduct. That is, they are averse to the
risk that the conduct indicated by the record will be repeated. A second 
prominent explanation treats aversion as manifesting and reproducing 
stigma that comes with being marked by the criminal justice system as 
morally suspect and socially other.  We draw on Link and Phelan’s 
articulation of stigma as labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and 
discrimination (2001) to describe how records mark individuals deserving of 
exclusion; the criminal record itself, independent of behavior, influences 
aversion. 
In this article, we examine whether aversion to records can be 
explained by repetition risk. We do so by building on the insight that, in a 
repetition risk framework, credible signals of past criminal conduct should 
have similar negative consequences for hiring, regardless of whether the 
signal comes from a criminal record or another source. The findings, which 
are based on an experimental employer survey of hypothetical job applicants
with recent drug use, contribute to scholarly and policy debates in three 
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ways.  First, consistent with stigma explanations, we show that employers 
evaluate applicants with records (and especially those with convictions) 
more negatively than applicants with similar illicit behavior signaled through 
non-criminal justice sources (e.g., social media).  Moreover, aversion persists
even after directly adjusting for employer predictions about risk of future 
behavior.  Second, we find that aversion varies by job type and is most 
evident among higher-status positions involving customer contact and office 
work, relative to those involving manual labor. Third, we find that aversion 
cannot easily be explained by other potential considerations, such as legal 
and firm-level constraints on hiring applicants with records. 
We conclude that aversion to criminal records is at least partly 
influenced by stigma associated with criminal justice contact, independent of
prior prohibited behavior. The role of stigma in aversion raises questions of 
equity not only in employment but also in other domains that evaluate 
records (e.g., landlords and school admissions; Desmond, 2016; Lageson, 
2016; Thatcher, 2008). These findings reinforce our understanding of the 
criminal justice system as a stratifying institution that marks individuals in 
ways that underwrite their future subordination.
REPETITION RISK AND STIGMA
Criminal record aversion can result from concerns about a person’s 
behavior and character, legal liabilities, occupational and licensing 
restrictions, and stigma related to criminal justice contact.  Although 
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scholarship does not typically distinguish among these explanations, we 
suggest that prominent rationales invoke repetition risk: decision makers’ 
concern that a person’s prior illicit behavior predicts similar future behavior. 
We contrast this explanation with reasons for aversion grounded in stigma.  
Our use of stigma is conceptually narrower than some scholarship on 
criminal records, in that we refer to aversion associated with the official 
criminal justice label only (apart from the offense that led to the record). 
REPETITION RISK
We propose the term repetition risk to describe explanations for 
employer aversion that view criminal records as informative and relevant 
indicators of an applicant’s future risk of prohibited behavior. We treat 
repetition risk as one consideration within a broader framework of risk 
management that views decision makers as rational actors who mitigate risk 
by using information about prior applicant behavior to make predictions 
about the likelihood of similar conduct occurring on the job (Taarup-
Esbensen, 2018). Hiring decision makers manage risk and liability by making
these predictions while navigating constraints on their time and resources, 
legal mandates, and institutional policies (Dobbin, 2009; Edelman, 2016; 
Lageson, Vuolo, & Uggen, 2015). Within this context, criminal records are 
viewed as quick, useful, and credible sources of information about past illicit 
behavior that bears on the risk of future behavior that decision makers 
prefer to avoid. 
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Legal and scholarly analyses often highlight the notion that employers 
use criminal records to ascertain future risk of criminal conduct, and that 
doing so is reasonable and appropriate. Repetition risk is central to legal 
doctrines that employers should consider the amount of time that has 
passed since the applicant’s offense, because the risk of repetition is 
expected to decline over time.  Similar concerns underlie scholarly 
“redemption” studies, which identify the period of time after which an 
individual’s criminal record no longer indicates an elevated risk of 
reoffending (Blumstein & Nakamura, 2009; Bushway, Nieuwbeerta, & 
Blokland, 2011; Kurlychek, Brame, & Bushway, 2006). Likewise, research on 
statistical race discrimination as a substitute for criminal record screening 
generally explains the phenomenon in terms of employers’ search for 
alternative sources of information about risks of future prohibited behavior 
(Agan, 2017). 
From a repetition risk standpoint, prior prohibited conduct could be 
signaled from a variety of credible sources, including but not limited to the 
criminal justice system; the source is important only insofar as it conveys 
accurate information about prior behavior.  For instance, the EEOC guidelines
distinguish between how employers should interpret behavior signaled via 
arrests versus convictions, giving reasons grounded in the accuracy of the 
information: convictions conclusively establish that the charged conduct 
occurred, while arrests import more uncertainty. In conjunction with 
corroborating information, including from outside the criminal justice system,
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however, an arrest can become functionally equivalent to a bare conviction 
(U.S. EEOC, 2012).  In other words, prior prohibited conduct is effectively 
signaled to the employer if the information source is considered credible. 
Alongside the passage of time, the other major legal criteria used to 
justify criminal record screenings focus on the strength of the “nexus,” or 
similarity, between the prior offense and the requirements of the job in 
question (Elmore, 2015).  For example, a theft offense is more concerning for
a truck driver with unmonitored access to valuable cargo than it is for a 
telemarketer (U.S. EEOC, 2012), and an embezzlement offense is more 
relevant to a financial adviser than a bus driver (Jacobs, 2015a). The criminal
record is viewed as an indicator of future risk, with the presumption that 
“past behavior is usually a good predictor of future behavior” (Jacobs, 2015a:
304). This nexus between the prior offense and future job duties is relevant 
only if employer concern focuses on repetition of the specific prior offense, 
as opposed to some unrelated future offense or misconduct. Of course, 
employers might characterize repetition risk at different levels of specificity 
(Bushway, 1998); for example, past use of one illegal drug might indicate 
future illegal drug use generally, future illegal conduct, or future 
“irresponsible” conduct broadly. Although an employer might consider all of 
these specifications relevant to hiring, this framework especially anticipates 
and legitimates employer considerations focused more narrowly on the 
relevance of the specific prior behavior to the current job. Accordingly, 
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repetition risk explanations predict a closer connection between more similar
attributes of past and future conduct. 
Negligent Hiring
A variation on the repetition risk framework posits that employers are 
averse to future illicit conduct for the specific reason that it could trigger 
negligent hiring lawsuits against them (Agan, 2017; Bushway, 2004; Finlay, 
2009; Lageson et al., 2015; Stoll & Bushway, 2008). Such lawsuits attempt to
hold employers responsible for injuries their employees inflict on certain 
third parties—i.e., customers and clients, but not coworkers1 (a point to 
which we return in the discussion)—based on the theory that the employer 
should have anticipated such potential harms and prevented them by not 
hiring the employee. The criminal record would alert them to the risk—via 
repetition—of future harmful conduct. The negligent hiring variant implies 
that employers are specially concerned about litigation costs of employee 
conduct, in addition to direct costs from lost productivity, damage to 
employer property, and so on.  Although some evidence indicates that 
employers are not concerned about liability (particularly those without large 
human resources departments) (Pager, 2007), other research finds that 
those hiring for positions with customer contact are more likely to check 
records (Holzer et al., 2007; Vuolo et al., 2017). 
1 Workers compensation laws generally bar employees from suing their employers for 
negligence. This basic principle of employment law, likely familiar to any human resources 
professional, applies to suits for negligent hiring, including those arising from workplace 
sexual or physical assault by co-workers (Larson & Robinson, 2017: 9-103, § 103.07; 
Peterson v. Arlington Hospitality Staffing, Inc.; Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc.).
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For present purposes, the critical question is whether criminal justice 
versus non-criminal justice signals differ in how much they expose employers
to litigation risk.  If they do, concern about negligent hiring lawsuits might 
present an exception to the prediction that the signal’s source should not 
matter to employers as long as it is credible.  In principle, however, the 
source should not matter legally: negligence is a question of whether the 
employer knew or should have known about the risk but failed to take 
appropriate precautions. For this reason, employers have been held liable for
negligent hiring based on their notice of worrisome past behavior from non-
criminal justice sources, such as past experience with the employee, 
statements by the employee, and so on (Restatement (Third) Torts, 2010; 
Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross). Despite this point, some employers might place
extra weight on signals from criminal records due to the frequent association
between records and negligent hiring concerns, or due to the possibility that 
judges or juries might give greater weight to employer notice from records 
than from other sources, even if those signals are equally predictive.
Legal and Firm-Level Constraints
Instrumentally rational decision makers might also be averse to hiring 
people with criminal records due to legal and firm-level regulations against 
hiring people with records (Holzer et al., 2004, Lageson et al., 2015).  
Individuals with felony convictions are often legally barred from certain 
occupations and professions by federal or state laws, including professional 
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licensure (Hahn, 2001; Jacobs, 2015a; Stafford, 2006). Additionally, firms 
may have internal policies about criminal convictions that restrict hiring 
(Lageson et al., 2015) and that also might influence individual decision 
makers to evaluate applicants more negatively. Thus, differential responses 
to criminal justice versus non-criminal justice signals might reflect legal and 
institutional constraints. 
STIGMA
In contrast to repetition risk explanations, stigma explanations 
describe aversion as specific to criminal justice contact. As Goffman 
proposed, stigma results when an attribute transforms a person “from a 
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one,” such that the attribute
and its stereotypes dominate a person’s identity ([1963] 1974:3). More 
recently, Link and Phelan describe stigma as a process of labeling, 
stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination (2001). In these 
ways, stigma has been connected to employment discrimination vis-à-vis 
race/ethnicity, disability, gender, and immigration status (Bagenstos, 2000; 
Pager & Karafin, 2009; Reskin, 2000; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003). However, 
unlike some of these areas, stigma attached to the criminal justice system 
(sometimes referred to as “legal stigma”) specifically involves government 
selection and labeling. Criminal records mark their bearers with “negative 
credentials” that institutionally brand them as a separate class and provide 
decision makers with a socially legitimated basis for exclusion (Pager, 2003; 
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Pager, 2007; Schwartz & Skolnick, 1962). In using the term stigma, we 
suggest that the label imparted by criminal justice contact itself, apart from 
behavior that was the basis for arrest or conviction, triggers stereotyping, 
separation, and status loss that influences employer aversion. 
Selection into criminal justice contact—and the application of criminal 
justice labels—is structured by stereotypes about deviance and culpability, 
characteristics that are shaped by age, race/ethnicity, gender, and their 
intersection (Becker, [1963]1991; Grattet, 2011).  Criminal justice agencies, 
through their priorities, policies, and practices, are more likely to select 
certain socio-demographic groups, such as racial/ethnic minorities living in 
poor areas, into criminal justice contact, even though illicit behaviors like 
drug use cut across socio-demographic lines (Beckett, 2012; Lynch, 2011; 
Rudovsky & Harris, 2018).  Once labeled, stigma involves stereotyping that 
connects records to a range of undesirable characteristics associated with 
the criminal justice system. These attributes—such as dangerousness and 
untrustworthiness—reflect broadly negative characteristics of a discredited 
group, as opposed to characteristics specific to the prohibited behavior that 
prompted criminal justice involvement for any individual (e.g., Becker, 
[1963]1991; Denver et al., 2017). 
Foundational to stigma is status and hierarchy (Link & Phelan, 2001). 
Criminal record labeling results in status loss at odds with “good” jobs, 
precluding entry into higher status positions, such as those involving 
customer contact, office work, or managerial tasks (Pager et al., 2009). At 
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the same time, stigmatic status loss might translate into positive preference 
for hiring into lower status jobs . Stigmatized applicants are deemed suitable 
(and even favored) for positions requiring manual labor and other types of 
“dirty work,” even as they are excluded from higher-status positions (Holzer, 
Raphael, & Stoll, 2004; Hughes, 1951; Pager et al., 2009; Peck & Theodore, 
2008; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003).  
Race/Ethnicity
Criminal record stigma is inextricably bound to stereotypes about race/
ethnicity, gender, and criminality. As mentioned, labeling via criminal justice 
contact is structured by institutional decisions and policing practices that 
target particular places and groups, resulting in large racial/ethnic 
disparities. Nearly half of non-Hispanic Black males will be arrested by age 
23 as compared to 38% of non-Hispanic white males (Brame, Bushway, 
Paternoster, & Turner, 2014), and 26% of young Black men will have been 
convicted of a crime as compared to 14% of all young adults (Lerman & 
Weaver, 2014). Following criminal justice contact, long-standing stereotypes 
that link blackness to criminality entrench and perpetuate the criminal 
record as an overpowering “master status” among Black men and other 
racial/ethnic minorities, which exacerbate separation, status loss, and 
discrimination (Hughes, 1945; Muhammad, 2011; Western, 2018). 
Empirically, experimental audit studies document that employer 
discrimination based on race/ethnicity alone is severe, and the additional 
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criminal justice penalty further reduces the likelihood of a positive evaluation
(Pager, 2003; Pager et al., 2009; Uggen et al., 2014). These studies find 
statistically similar criminal justice penalties across racial/ethnic groups;2 
however, given the differential prevalence of criminal justice contact and 
labeling among racial/ethnic minority groups, the penalties exacerbate race/
ethnicity inequalities in hiring overall.  Indeed, as discussed earlier, the 
differential impact of criminal record aversion for racial/ethnic minorities in 
employment underlies the application of race discrimination law to criminal 
record screening. 
CURRENT STUDY
Employer aversion to criminal records could be driven by both 
repetition risk and stigma. The balance between the two is important 
because policy and scholarly responses often suggest that aversion to 
repetition risk, even if imperfectly implemented, may provide the entire 
explanation. Because this type of rational risk management is viewed as 
defensible, the implication is that regulation of criminal record screening is 
unnecessary, except possibly to provide better information that facilitates 
more accurate assessments of future risk (e.g., Strahilevitz, 2008). In 
contrast, employer decision-making based on stigma would be more in line 
with widely accepted bases for regulating employment discrimination. By 
drawing on the arguments laid out above regarding repetition risk and 
2 However, criminal record stigma might differ across racial/ethnic groups depending on 
context, such as whether the applicant has personal contact with an employer (Pager, 
2003), and hiring stage, such as whether the hiring outcome is a callback or hiring decision. 
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stigma, we suggest three main sets of hypotheses to distinguish between 
these two mechanisms. 
First, if hiring decision makers operate with a repetition risk framework,
they will evaluate job applicants who exhibit prior prohibited conduct (in this 
case, drug use) similarly, regardless of whether the signal of prior conduct 
comes from the criminal justice system or other credible sources (hypothesis
1a). In contrast, if stigma explains aversion, hiring decision makers will more 
negatively evaluate applicants with criminal justice contact, such as having 
an arrest or conviction record (hypothesis 1b), and their evaluations may be 
particularly negative when considering Black male applicants (as opposed to 
white male applicants) with records (hypothesis 1b1) given stereotypes that 
link blackness and criminality (Muhammad, 2011).  Moreover, employers will 
be concerned about a range of generalized undesirable behaviors, not only 
repetition of the prior conduct (hypothesis 1b2).
Second, if decision makers act according to repetition risk to avoid the 
specific concern of negligent hiring liability, they will more negatively 
evaluate applicants for positions that require customer contact, which are 
most relevant to future liability, as opposed to positions that involve office 
work or manual labor (hypothesis 2a). On the other hand, if stigma 
undergirds aversion, decision makers will more negatively evaluate 
applicants for higher-status positions, such as those that require customer 
contact or office work, as opposed to lower-status positions that involve 
manual labor (hypothesis 2b).
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Third, hiring decision makers operating from a repetition risk 
framework might more negatively evaluate applicants with criminal records 
because of legal exclusions or firm-level constraints regarding records.  If so, 
decision-makers’ evaluations will become similar across applicants once 
adjusting for those constraints (hypothesis 3a).  On the other hand, if stigma 
drives aversion, decision makers will continue to evaluate applicants with 
records more negatively even after these adjustments (hypothesis 3b). 
STUDY DESIGN
We utilize data from an Internet survey experiment with U.S. adults 
who make hiring decisions for their firms. The survey was administered in 
Spring 2017 to 2,841 respondents sampled from an opt-in panel maintained 
by Research Now. Research Now maintains a “B2B” panel with information 
on a person’s employment, allowing us to target hiring decision makers 
(Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips, & Vansant, 2014). Potential 
respondents for the B2B panel were recruited through open enrollment and 
invitation methods, and members were then invited to participate in surveys 
in exchange for incentives from Research Now. In this study, e-mail 
invitations were sent to 15,275 panel members who previously identified 
themselves as hiring decision makers and/or small business owners.  We 
then screened respondents based on age (18 years and older) and hiring 
decision making, such that respondents were eligible to participate if they 
answered yes to the following question: do you currently work in a position 
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where you make hiring decisions about job applicants? Of the 5,890 people 
that opened the survey link (39% of those invited), we excluded people who 
are under 18 years old (n=48) and who do not currently make hiring 
decisions (n=2,548). We also excluded people who did not consent to the 
study (n=250), did not finish the survey (n=201), or who completed it more 
than once (n=2). Our final analytic sample (n=2,841) includes respondents 
from all fifty states and represents 22.4% of those originally contacted who 
met the eligibility criteria, a response rate consistent with with online 
surveys (Tourangeau, Conrad, & Couper, 2013). If bias exists in the likelihood
of completing a survey based on a particular topic, research indicates that 
the bias would need to be large to affect estimated relationships between 
variables (Pickett, Cullen, Bushway, Chiricos, & Alpert, 2018).
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
Respondents were asked to evaluate job application materials for one 
of four randomly-assigned applicants: a) one with no indications of prior 
prohibited conduct (“control”), b) one with a social media signal of prior 
prohibited conduct (“drug use”) through a Facebook page, c) one with the 
same social media signal of prior prohibited conduct, plus a corresponding 
drug possession arrest that did not lead to conviction (“arrest”), and d) one 
with the same social media signal of prior prohibited conduct, plus a 
corresponding drug possession arrest and conviction (“conviction”). All 
applicants were male, consistent with other experimental studies in this area
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(Pager, 2003; Pager et al., 2009; Uggen et al., 2014), and respondents were 
asked to evaluate one job applicant in order to avoid comparisons when 
evaluating multiple applicants.3
Each group was further differentiated by race—specifically, Black and 
white applicants—as signaled through an avatar image on the Facebook 
page (see Appendix).  All avatar characteristics, except skin and hair color, 
were identical.4 This provides an admittedly limited signal of a complex, 
socially constructed process (Sen & Wasow, 2016) and we found no race 
interactions; accordingly, we group together Black and white applicants in 
most analyses. 
We focus on a felony offense for cocaine possession, as opposed to a 
violent or property crime, for several reasons. First, drug possession has 
been the focal offense for landmark audit studies on criminal records (Pager, 
2003; Pager et al., 2009).  Second, drug possession is a relatively minor 
felony offense, which can (but need not) result in incarceration; this helps to 
disentangle potential employer aversion to transformative effects of 
incarceration from the criminal record itself (we return to this point in the 
Discussion). Third, prior drug use (and subsequent sobriety) is a behavior 
that more easily lends itself to signaling via social media. The findings are 
3 This concern is less relevant in audit or correspondence tests, which typically use matched 
designs, where employers receive numerous job applications. A non-matched design has the
additional advantages in estimating sample size and power at the design stage (Vuolo, 
Uggen, & Lageson, 2016; 2018). 
4 We refrained from signaling race through racially differentiated names because these may 
also convey socioeconomic status (e.g., Gaddis, 2017).
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specific to this offense, since employers may be more averse to violent and 
property offenses compared to drug offenses (Holzer et al., 2007).
For all applicants, respondents were asked to evaluate a packet of 
application materials consisting of a one-page job application, a background 
check, and a Facebook homepage (see Appendix).  Drug use without criminal
justice contact (applicant (b)) was signaled through the Facebook homepage,
where the applicant’s top post referred to prior cocaine addiction and 
subsequent sobriety. Cocaine addiction implies more severe drug use than 
sporadic or casual use of an unspecified drug. Accordingly, we suggest that 
any additional severity implied by selection into criminal justice contact 
would be marginal. Because this applicant (and the control applicant) had no
criminal justice contact, we included a background report in the application 
materials that listed no court records. The criminal justice treatments of 
arrest and conviction for drug possession (applicants (c) and (d)) were 
conveyed through the job application and background check materials; other
information on the job application and background check, as well as the 
Facebook page, remained the same as for the drug use applicant (b). Thus, 
all applicants with drug use shared a social media signal of prior cocaine 
addiction and rehabilitation; criminal justice contact was an additional5 signal
referring to the same conduct and time period. For the control applicant (a), 
5 This additional evidence of drug use raises the possibility that any observed incremental 
aversion to the record reflects the amplification of the social media drug use signal, not 
aversion specific to criminal justice contact.  We return to this issue in the Discussion.
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the Facebook page included a neutral placeholder post in lieu of the drug use
reference.6
Apart from these differences, other applicant information was 
consistent across groups. Applicants had the same name, education, and 
work history (high school graduate; experience in three jobs, ranging from 
restaurant/service to office to labor positions and paying from $7.85 to $9.00
per hour, aligning with minimum wages at the respective times and 
locations), to indicate a less-skilled applicant with experience for an entry-
level position requiring customer contact, office work, and/or manual labor. 
The employment dates were standardized across groups, while also 
consistent with the timing of prior drug use, arrest and conviction (when 
relevant); there was no variation in the recency of prior prohibited conduct 
across applicant groups that signaled previous drug use. Work history and 
conviction dates were constructed to allow for a brief incarceration, but they 
also did not explicitly state that the applicant had been incarcerated nor 
indicate a break in employment that might imply incarceration. 
Using an experimental survey design with a B2B panel has advantages
and limitations.  A primary strength is that the experimental design 
addresses issues of selection and omitted variable bias, which observational 
studies cannot easily resolve.  A second advantage is that we could solicit 
responses from hiring decision makers, as opposed to less relevant groups 
6 As the Appendix shows, the top post on the Facebook page for drug use applicants stated, 
“Haven’t touched coke for 2 years now.  Feels good to be clean, not high!” and was 
accompanied by an image (“Hugs not drugs”).  The neutral post for the control applicant 
had the same image, but the top post stated, “Yup.”
20
such as college students or adults in other occupations.  Third, the survey 
format enables us to signal prior prohibited behavior through non-criminal 
justice sources such as social media. Although nationally representative polls
suggest that most employers (70% in 2017) use social media to screen 
candidates (CareerBuilder, 2017), consistent signaling would be difficult to 
ensure in an alternative setting, such as an audit study.  Fourth, the survey 
approach permits us to examine potential mediators for employer aversion, 
including perceptions about the applicant’s likelihood of future prohibited 
behavior, unlike audit studies that examine black-box decisional outcomes. 
A survey experiment also has limitations, particularly relative to an 
audit in the field.  First, employers’ stated evaluations might differ from their 
actual hiring behavior.  Hiring decision making in the field would be 
influenced by additional constraints, such as the need to fill positions and 
labor market conditions.  Social desirability bias may also influence survey 
answers, leading to more lenient evaluations of applicants with records. 
Although social desirability bias is consequential for studies of racial 
discrimination (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Pager & Quillian, 2005), its relevance 
to discrimination based on social media signals of behavior is unclear, and 
there is mixed evidence regarding criminal records. Research finds smaller 
differences between stated preferences and behaviors when considering 
criminal record discrimination (Pager & Quillian, 2005) and employers are 
often quite willing to state that they do not hire applicants with records 
(Holzer et al., 2007).  A second limitation concerns selection into the opt-in 
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online panel of hiring decision makers. Online survey respondents not only 
have Internet access but are likely more adept at navigating the Internet, 
and relatedly, social media; however, these considerations may be less 
important in a study of hiring decision makers than elsewhere (Tourangeau 
et al., 2013). Moreover, with the growing prevalence of online surveys for 
marketing and social science research, some respondents might choose to 
take certain surveys or regularly take online surveys.  Although it is unclear 
how frequent participation influences findings, respondent fatigue might lead
to more error, putting a downward bias on the estimates. In our survey, we 
embedded a question to assess attentiveness, and we present 
supplementary findings restricted to the sample that correctly answered the 
question.
MEASURES
Respondents answered survey questions following their review of 
applicant materials. Attention was paid to question ordering to prevent 
respondents from being unintentionally influenced by previous questions in 
their evaluations.7                         
Attribute Scale. Respondents evaluated, on a seven-point scale,8 the 
applicant’s expected future behavior on the following attributes: team 
7 Respondents were asked, in this order, about their likelihood of offering a positive 
response to the applicant, whether anything disqualified the applicant, and their evaluation 
of applicant characteristics, including likelihood of future drug use.  
8 For each attribute, respondents chose from the following answers: (1) extremely 
inaccurate, (2) very inaccurate, (3) somewhat inaccurate, (4) neutral, (5) somewhat 
accurate, (6) very accurate, and (7) extremely accurate. 
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player, late or absent often, follow workplace rules, steal from the workplace,
work well with customers, respectful of workplace authority, use 
inappropriate language, hard worker, and get into a fight.  In some analyses, 
negative attributes (e.g., late or absent often, steal from the workplace, etc.)
are reverse coded and averaged into an overall scale, where larger values 
indicate more positive evaluations (α = .80). 
Likely to Hire.  Respondents were asked, on a seven-point scale,9 about
their likelihood of offering a positive response to the applicant for customer 
contact, office work, and manual labor positions.  They were asked: “You are 
under pressure to quickly fill a variety of entry-level positions within your 
firm. How likely would you be to call back or interview this applicant for a 
position within your firm requiring: customer contact [office work, physical 
labor]?” In some analyses, answers are aggregated into a single likely to hire
estimate (α = .87). 
We examine both the attribute scale and the likely to hire measures as
outcomes. The former measure captures expectations about the applicant’s 
future behaviors, and the latter measure takes into account other concerns, 
such as firm preferences and the relative standing of the applicant compared
to the firm’s typical applicant pool.
Other Measures. In some analyses, we measure future drug use, firm-
level policies regarding convictions, and legal prohibitions against hiring.  For
future drug use, we ask the respondent to assess the applicant’s likelihood of
9 Respondents were asked to choose from the following answers: (1) extremely unlikely, (2) 
very unlikely, (3) somewhat unlikely, (4) neither likely nor unlikely, (5) somewhat likely, (6) 
very likely, and (7) extremely likely. 
23
being under the influence of drugs or alcohol at work.  For firm-level policies 
about convictions, we include a categorical variable based on whether the 
firm has no policy, the hire must be approved by human resources, or the 
applicant is immediately disqualified.  For legal prohibitions, we use a 
measure of whether the respondent states that the applicant is disqualified 
from the position due to a “legal prohibition.”10   
10 To avoid priming the respondent, we did not ask whether the legal prohibition specifically 
concerned prior drug use, arrest, or conviction.  Consequently, this measure captures any 
perceived legal constraint, including but not limited to hiring someone with a criminal 
record.
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ANALYTIC METHODS
Our analysis proceeds in three main stages.  First, we compare 
employer evaluations for the control, drug use, arrest, and conviction groups.
The repetition risk explanation (hypothesis 1a) predicts that evaluations will 
be similarly negative across the drug use, arrest, and conviction groups 
relative to the control group.  The stigma explanation (hypothesis 1b) 
proposes that applicants with criminal justice contact (e.g., arrest or 
conviction) will be more negatively evaluated compared to both the control 
and drug use applicants. We assess differences across groups using t-tests 
(for the attribute scale) and ordered logit regression models (for the likely to 
hire measures) to account for multiple answers for customer contact, office 
work, and manual labor positions across respondents. We also examine 
differences in the attribute scale and likely to hire outcomes across these 
groups by applicant race in regression models, in order to investigate 
whether aversion to records is particularly consequential for Black applicants
(hypothesis 1b1). 
As part of this analysis, we examine the connection between prior and 
future prohibited conduct across groups.  We investigate how different 
signals of prior prohibited conduct are associated with employer predictions 
about future related conduct (drug or alcohol use at work) and a range of 
other attributes (e.g., team player, late or absent often, etc.).  Results 
consistent with the repetition risk explanation would predict the most 
25
negative evaluations for future drug use, as compared to more distant 
attributes, such as being a team player. Stigma explanations predict 
negative evaluations across a range of attributes, indicative of generalized 
aversion (hypothesis 1b2).  
We also directly adjust for employer predictions of future drug use in 
regression models, as an additional test of whether employer aversion to 
records remains even after directly accounting for expectations about future 
behavior.  Although repetition risk explanations should not depend on the 
signal’s source, as long as it is credible, decision makers could be more 
averse to applicants with criminal justice contact if they perceive that it 
signals particularly severe forms of prior behavior (and higher risk of future 
behavior). In other words, decision makers might interpret criminal justice 
contact as selecting among illegal drug users (even among those who 
indicated prior cocaine addiction) on the basis of more serious or extensive 
drug use that corresponds with more severe risk of future drug use. If 
employers operating from a repetition risk standpoint perceive a greater 
likelihood of future prohibited conduct among applicants with criminal justice
contact, differences in aversion should disappear once differential 
predictions of future prohibited conduct are taken into account. 
In the second analytic stage, we examine whether aversion varies 
among job positions requiring customer contact, office work, and manual 
labor. If respondents are averse to applicants with records because of 
concerns that repeated criminal conduct could trigger future negligent hiring
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lawsuits, we expect greater penalties for positions involving customer 
contact, relative to office work and manual labor positions (hypothesis 2a).  
If, however, stigma undergirds aversion, office work and customer contact 
position should be treated similarly, with greater penalties for these higher-
status positions relative to manual labor positions (hypothesis 2b).   
In the third analytic stage, we examine whether legal exclusions and 
firm-level constraints explain aversion towards applicants with records. If 
employers are operating from a repetition risk framework, evaluations should
be similar across applicants after legal prohibitions and firm policies are 
considered (hypothesis 3a).  However, aversion to criminal records that 
persists, even after making these adjustments, provides further evidence of 
stigma’s influence (hypothesis 3b). To adjust for firm-level policies, we 
include variables in regression models for policies about convictions that 
require additional scrutiny for or simply exclude applicants with convictions. 
To account for legal prohibitions, we limit the analytic sample to respondents
who do not state that they are legally prohibited from hiring the applicant. 
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive information about the sample of 
respondents and their firms.  The majority of respondents is male (60%), 
white (89%), and has a college degree (77%).  The median age is 46 to 50 
years old, and the median amount of time spent in hiring positions ranges 
from 6 to 10 years.  Respondents come from a variety of industries, including
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finance and professional (28%), labor (22%), sales (14%), and service (22%). 
The majority work in for-profit firms (82%) and in firms located in only one 
state (75%).  Nearly half report no firm-level policy regarding convictions 
(48%), although one-quarter (24%) state that applicants with convictions are 
immediately disqualified from any position within their firm.  A minority 
(12%) report that they are legally prohibited from hiring the applicant that 
they evaluated.  Because of the opt-in nature of the sample, these estimates 
are presented for contextual purposes.
[Table 1 About Here]
Table 2 presents means for the attribute scale and likely to hire 
outcomes.  For both outcomes, respondents evaluate the control applicant 
(no prior drug use) most positively (attribute scale = 4.74, likely to hire = 
3.69), with decreasingly favorable evaluations for the applicant with prior 
drug use (attribute scale = 4.52, likely to hire = 3.37), with an arrest 
(attribute scale = 4.44, likely to hire = 3.26), and with a conviction (attribute 
scale = 4.36, likely to hire = 3.19). For the attribute scale, a conviction 
reduces the mean by .16 (p <.001), or a one-fifth of a standard deviation 
decrease in the scale, compared to drug use only. For the likely to hire 
outcome, a conviction reduces the mean by .18 (p <.05), or a one-tenth of a 
standard deviation decrease, compared to drug use only.11 Overall, 
11 We repeated this analysis with a sample restricted to respondents that correctly answered
a question, embedded in the set of attribute questions, that assessed respondent 
attentiveness (Tourangeau et al., 2013). The results are very similar to the full analytic 
sample, with two exceptions.  First, for the attribute scale, the difference between 
assessments for conviction and arrest is marginally significant (not at the .05 level, as in the 
full sample).  Second, for the likely to hire outcome, the difference between conviction and 
drug use is marginally significant (not at the .05 level).
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respondents are averse to all applicants with evidence of prior drug use, but 
their aversion is most severe towards those who also have criminal justice 
contact, and particularly, those with convictions. Differential aversion to 
those with records goes against our predictions for the repetition risk 
explanation alone (hypothesis 1a) and lends support to stigma playing a role 
(hypothesis 2a). 
[Table 2 About Here]
Next, we examine several questions related to the main analyses.  
First, we investigate the relationship between prior and future prohibited 
conduct, by examining predictions about the likelihood of future drug and 
alcohol use at work.  Figure 1, Panel A displays differences between the 
control applicant and other groups (e.g., applicant with prior drug use, arrest,
and conviction) for various attributes.  Respondents expect that applicants 
with prior drug use (but no criminal justice contact) will be more likely to be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at work compared to the control 
applicant (mean = 3.58 compared to control mean = 3.25, p < .001).  
However, applicants with criminal justice contact are associated with even 
higher predictions of future drug or alcohol use at work.  Figure 1, Panel B 
displays differences between likelihood of future drug use for drug use 
applicants and applicants with an arrest (mean = 3.71, p < .10) and a 
conviction (mean = 3.77, p < .05).  Respondents expect that applicants with 
criminal records are more likely to repeat prior prohibited conduct—i.e., drug
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use—compared to applicants with similar prior conduct but without criminal 
justice contact.  
[Figure 1 About Here]
Figure 1 also compares employer predictions about other applicant 
attributes across experimental manipulations.  As Panels A and B show, 
respondents generally evaluate applicants with drug use, arrest, and 
conviction more negatively in terms of these other attributes. Exceptions 
include the likelihood of being “late or absent often” and using 
“inappropriate language,” where respondents do not evaluate the drug use 
applicant (without criminal contact) to be significantly more likely to exhibit 
these attributes. In contrast, applicants with criminal records are ascribed 
these characteristics (“late or absent” and “inappropriate language”) 
significantly more, as compared both to the control group (Figure 1, Panel A) 
and to applicants with drug use only (Figure 1, Panel B).  Moreover, 
respondents are significantly more averse to applicants with convictions, in 
particular, across the range of negative attributes, including the likelihood of 
stealing and getting into a fight.  Respondents are also significantly less 
likely to expect applicants with convictions to work well with customers and 
respect workplace authority, as compared to applicants with drug use only.  
Although respondents generally evaluate applicants with arrests more 
negatively compared to drug use applicants, there are some exceptions 
(e.g., “team player” and “follow rules”), and most of these differences are 
not statistically significant. 
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We directly adjust for predictions about future drug use in regression 
models.  This accounts for the possibility that criminal justice contact signals 
more severe prior conduct (with greater risk of repetition) compared to 
behavior indicated through social media. Table 3, Model 1 shows estimates 
for the attribute scale and likely to hire outcomes, which parallel the main 
results in Table 2; Model 2 includes future drug use as a covariate.  For the 
attribute scale, adjusting for future drug use substantially reduces the 
coefficient for drug use, arrest, and conviction (by 45%, 48%, and 42%, 
respectively); even so, respondent evaluations remain significantly more 
negative for applicants with convictions, as compared to control applicants 
(b = -.22, p <.001, corresponding to a .28 decrease in the standard 
deviation), applicants with drug use only (b = -.10, p <.01, corresponding to 
a .13 decrease in the standard deviation), and applicants with arrests (b = 
-.07, p <.05; corresponding to a .09 decrease in the standard deviation).12  
For likely to hire, predictions about future drug use make little difference, 
although the coefficient on conviction is now marginally significant (b = -.46, 
p = .06). 
[Table 3 About Here] 
In additional analyses (available upon request), we repeat the main 
models by further distinguishing applicants by race. In regression models 
(the equivalent of Table 3, Model 1), we include a variable distinguishing 
Black and white applicants, to test a direct effect of race on employer 
12 The latter two estimates for coefficients and p-values are based on regression models that
change the reference group to drug use and arrest, respectively. 
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evaluations, and interactions between the experimental manipulations and 
race, to test whether criminal record aversion is stronger for Black 
applicants.  For both the attribute scale and the likely to hire outcomes, we 
find no significant direct effect of race and no interaction effects. The 
coefficients for the experimental manipulations predicting the attribute scale
are similar to the main models (drug use: b = -.20, p <.001; arrest: b = -.23, 
p <.001; conviction: b = -.37, p <.001) and conviction remains significantly 
different from drug use only and arrest.  For likely to hire, the coefficients are
also generally similar to the main models (drug use: b = -.33, p <.01; arrest: 
b = -.28, p <.05; conviction: b = -.49, p <.001), although the difference 
between a conviction and drug use only is not significant.
AVERSION BY JOB TYPE
Next, we examine whether aversion varies by job type. Higher aversion
related to positions requiring customer contact suggests that employers are 
concerned about future negligent hiring liability, consistent with repetition 
risk predictions (hypothesis 2a).  In contrast, higher aversion related to 
positions that are higher-status (e.g., requiring customer contact or office 
work) aligns with stigma expectations (hypothesis 2b).  Table 4 displays 
means for likely to hire outcomes across these three job types. Similar to the
pattern of results in the main models (Table 2), evaluations of applicants 
with drug use only, an arrest, and a conviction are increasingly negative 
across experimental manipulations for customer contact positions.  
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Compared to drug use only, a conviction results in a .24 decrease in the 
likely to hire estimate (p <.01), or a nearly one-third (.31) of a standard 
deviation decrease. In isolation, these results for customer contact positions 
are consistent with negligent hiring concerns. However, the same pattern of 
increasing aversion also characterizes positions requiring office work. That 
setting is arguably less relevant to negligent hiring liability because co-
workers rather than customers bear risk of injury; however, it is similar to 
customer contact positions as a higher-status job. In contrast, for manual 
labor positions, drug use applicants are evaluated similarly, regardless of 
whether they have criminal records.  
[Table 4 About Here] 
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LEGAL AND FIRM-LEVEL CONSTRAINTS
The results indicate particular aversion to applicants with convictions 
for positions requiring customer contact and office work.  This could reflect 
spillover effects from firm-level policies about convictions or legal 
prohibitions against hiring applicants with records. These could influence 
both respondents’ hiring decisions and their general evaluations when 
operating from a rational risk management framework (hypothesis 3a). 
Aversion that persists after accounting for these external constraints, 
however, would provide further evidence that employers are influenced by 
stigma (hypothesis 3b). To examine firm-level policies, Table 5, Model 1 
includes variables for firm-level conviction policies; including these measures
does not change the substantive differences across experimental groups and
job type. To adjust for legal constraints, Model 2 excludes respondents who 
state that a legal prohibition disqualifies the applicant from the position. For 
the attribute scale, employers not under legal prohibitions still negatively 
evaluate applicants with criminal justice contact—for both convictions and 
arrests—in relation to applicants with drug use only (denoted by (a)). For 
these respondents, an arrest decreases the attribute scale by .08 (p<.05), or
one-tenth (.11) of a standard deviation, and a conviction decreases the scale
by .13 (p<.01), or one-sixth (.17) of a standard deviation. For the likely to 
hire outcomes (panels B, C, and D in Table 5), these respondents evaluate 
applicants with arrest and convictions more negatively, but again, only for 
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positions requiring customer contact and office work. Although in this smaller
sample, most of these likely-to-hire differences are not statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the coefficients for arrest and conviction for 
customer contact and office positions are similar to those in the full sample. 
[Table 5 About Here]
DISCUSSION
We utilize an experimental employer survey to examine two 
explanations for aversion: repetition risk and stigma. The results suggest 
three main findings, all indicating that aversion is not solely explained by 
repetition risk and depends in part on stigma.  First, employers are more 
averse to applicants with criminal records compared to those with similar 
behavior signaled through social media. Even after adjusting for employers’ 
predictions about future drug use (and apart from the experimental design 
itself), aversion to records remains.  Moreover, rather than singling out 
repetition of prior conduct as a risk, employers predict that applicants with 
criminal records (and especially, convictions) are more likely to engage in a 
range of undesirable behaviors. Some of these (e.g., using inappropriate 
language) are quite distant from the specific behavior of prior drug use. 
Overall, the pattern of results is consistent with the view that stigma 
influences negative evaluations.
We additionally examined whether aversion is particularly severe 
towards Black applicants. We did not find evidence of a direct penalty for 
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Black applicants nor did we find that race moderates the association 
between criminal records and aversion.  Although audit studies also find 
statistically similar penalties of a criminal record for Black and white 
applicants (e.g., Pager, 2003; Pager et al., 2009; Uggen et al., 2014), the lack
of a direct race penalty is at odds with these studies and a large body of 
research that documents persistent racial discrimination (e.g., Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Gaddis, 2015; Kirschenman & Neckerman, 1991). There 
are several possible explanations for this difference.  First, respondents may 
not have received the race signal as effectively as they would in an actual 
hiring context.  Second, race may be consequential in deciding whether to 
call-back an applicant in the context of having to choose among a range of 
potentially qualified applicants, even if it does not influence the specific 
evaluations captured by the attribute scale and likely to hire measures. 
Third, race-based manipulations may be particularly prone to social 
desirability bias, given that racial discrimination is widely acknowledged as 
illegitimate and illegal in hiring.  Recent research suggests that individuals 
may be increasingly aware of their need to regulate any appearance of 
differential treatment based on race (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008).
Consequently, we interpret the findings by race with caution, and note that 
even statistically similar criminal record penalties across groups generate 
racial/ethnic disparities in hiring given the differential prevalence of criminal 
justice contact. 
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A second primary finding is that employer aversion varies by job 
position. The pattern of similar aversion across positions requiring either 
customer contact or office work, but not manual labor, is inconsistent with 
aversion driven by negligent hiring concerns because harms to customers 
produce greater exposure to liability than do harms to coworkers covered by 
workers compensation. Instead, the findings align with stigma explanations 
that predict applicants encounter status-linked aversion incompatible with 
hiring into higher status positions and “good” jobs.  Indeed, scholarship on 
stigma finds that employer aversion does not apply to “dirty work,” and in 
some cases, employers prefer to hire stigmatized applicants for “bad” jobs 
(Pager et al., 2009; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003). These findings reinforce the 
need in future research to distinguish among positions and capture not only 
functionally different job requirements but also status distinctions that 
render positions more or less suited to hiring stigmatized workers (Bumiller, 
2015).  
Negligent hiring concerns aside, employers could be averse to 
applicants with records because both customers and co-workers are 
themselves averse to working in or buying from a firm that employs people 
with criminal records. Even if these third parties’ aversion goes beyond the 
employer’s own assessment of repetition risk, employers might penalize 
applicants with records to satisfy their customers’ and employees’ 
preferences, including ones potentially grounded in stigma.  Here, employers
manage potential costs that do not arise from the repetition of future 
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conduct (or related negligent hiring liability) but that nonetheless may be 
part of a rational strategy to maximize customer and co-worker satisfaction. 
This potential mechanism, however, does not obviously predict the observed 
variation by job type, where criminal record penalties are absent from 
manual labor positions but present in both customer contact and office work 
positions, even though co-worker backlash presumably would occur in each 
case. Moreover, as with employers who cater to the racial prejudices of 
customers and co-workers despite not sharing them, such “rational 
discrimination” based on third-party aversion is generally treated in law and 
policy as failing to justify aversion (Bagenstos 2003). Stigma still influences 
employer decision making, but at one step removed via deference to third-
party preferences.
A third finding is that aversion largely persists even after accounting 
for firm-level policies or legal prohibitions that could constrain decision 
makers’ hiring of applicants with records.  Although we do not discount the 
importance of such policies and restrictions, the results indicate that they 
cannot fully explain employers’ negative evaluations. Rather, individual 
decision makers—apart from their firm’s formal policies and external 
constraints—continue to express aversion to criminal records when 
performing their hiring function.
Overall, the findings underscore the power of the criminal record in 
hiring decision-making. The record itself not only worsens perceptions of 
future risks that prior conduct will be repeated but also underwrites 
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ascription of a range of negative attributes to its holders that extend far 
beyond the behavior that originally prompted criminal justice contact.  As 
institutional markers, or negative credentials (Pager, 2003; 2007), criminal 
records are imbued with perceptions of legitimate exclusion that take 
precedent over the actual behavior and statements of the individual. In the 
hands of decision makers with limited time and resources, these aspects of 
criminal records can become an applicant’s “master status,” which overrides
other qualifications and assigns a range of stigmatized behaviors that are 
largely uncoupled from the underlying illegal conduct (Hughes, 1945).  
Moreover, because selection into criminal justice contact is influenced not 
only by a person’s conduct but also a range of other factors related to 
race/ethnicity, neighborhood, and gender (e.g., Beckett, 2012; Rudovsky & 
Harris, 2018), reliance on the record as a sorting mechanism exacerbates 
socioeconomic inequalities and does not provide decision makers with the 
neutral filter envisioned by a repetition risk framework.  
Our aim for this article was to conceptualize a common justification for 
employer aversion in policy, legal, and scholarly debates—which we term 
repetition risk—and to test whether it adequately explains aversion in an 
experimental context. Raising this idea implicates a more general question: 
how do employers interpret criminal records and what information do they 
attribute to records? For example, some scholarship discusses 
“transformative effects” of criminal justice contact, and particularly, the 
deterioration of human capital and “soft skills” due to incarceration (Pager, 
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2007; Western, 2002).  Employers might interpret criminal records as 
indicating poor communication and job skills resulting from imprisonment 
itself. Several considerations minimize our concern that this explanation 
drives our findings. First, the study design held constant all applicant 
characteristics, with the exception of prior prohibited conduct and its signal.  
Second, applicant materials did not explicitly convey incarceration; although 
incarceration may be a logical extension of criminal justice contact, 
respondents were not given direct evidence of this. Applicants’ employment 
histories were constructed to allow for the possibility of no incarceration, and
any incarceration could not have exceeded one year. Third, employers show 
aversion toward applicants with arrests, as well as convictions, even though 
incarceration (and corresponding transformative effects) are likely to be 
minimally associated with arrest.
A second example relates to employer perceptions about the reasons 
for criminal justice contact. Employers might believe that a criminal record 
signals not only illicit behavior reflected in the recorded charge (e.g., drug 
possession) but also other types of illicit behaviors (e.g. theft, violence, etc.) 
that prompted law enforcement action but did not generate a formal record. 
For instance, initial charges may be downgraded at later stages of 
prosecution, including through plea bargaining (Feeley, 1982; LaFave, 1970; 
Wright & Engen, 2007); the resulting conviction does not reflect illicit 
conduct that may have initially motivated arrest and prosecution. Although 
we exclude this specific possibility by coupling conviction records with arrest 
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records showing the same initial charge, it remains possible—though we are 
aware of no research demonstrating it—that employers believe that police 
officers decide to arrest a person for drug possession in part because the 
person engaged in other illicit conduct that is known to the officer but is not 
the formal basis for arrest. Such employers might treat the drug offense 
record as indicating possible future repetition of either the drug offense or 
other illicit, uncharged activity that led to the arrest. 
We do not view the pattern of findings as supporting this explanation. 
First, employer predictions about the likelihood of serious illicit behaviors, 
such as stealing and fighting, are in line with their predictions about other 
attributes indicating generalized undesirability, such as being late or absent 
and using inappropriate language. Second, employers are not any more 
averse to applicants with records, as compared to those with drug use 
signaled via social media, when hiring for low-status jobs requiring manual 
labor.  If employers were operating from the belief that records connote 
more serious forms of illicit behavior like violence or theft, we would expect 
to see this reflected in their evaluation of specific attributes and in aversion 
across all job types.
Both explanations—transformative effects and other illicit behaviors—
raise questions about the meaning of the record to employers. Do employers
believe that records connote incarceration and transformative effects? Do 
employers have a sophisticated account of how people are selected into 
criminal justice contact, such that they believe an arrest record indicates 
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additional serious behavior, as opposed to vulnerability to criminal justice 
institutions for other reasons, like race/ethnicity, neighborhood, etc.? If 
employers believe that criminal records indicate these and other potentially 
instrumental concerns, which may or may not be supported by empirical 
evidence, this additionally raises the question of how to interpret situations 
where inaccurate beliefs form the basis of seemingly rational decision 
making. In the context of racial discrimination in hiring, Pager and Karafin 
draw from social-psychological theory on “subtyping” to explain how 
employers use seemingly rational explanations to justify their aversion to 
Black applicants, even though the explanations may be based in inaccurate 
and disconfirming information (2009). In the case of criminal records, 
inaccurate beliefs about criminal justice contact may similarly exacerbate 
stereotypes and stigma, even though they are put forward within a model of 
rational decision making. 
Because our findings are specific to certain design choices (e.g., felony
drug possession, high school diploma, etc.), they call for additional research 
that examines how mechanisms such as repetition risk and stigma might 
differ based on other applicant characteristics (e.g., Gaddis, 2015; Nunley, 
Pugh, Romero, & Seals, 2017).  In this article, as previously noted, our focus 
on drug possession has certain advantages (e.g., its relevance to prior 
criminal record studies, the feasibility of keeping job history timelines 
consistent across groups, etc.). We consider this choice to be a conservative 
test of divergence between repetition risk and stigma explanations.  Prior 
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work indicates that employers are typically less averse to drug-related 
offenses, as opposed to violent and property crimes (Holzer et al., 2007).  
Moreover, in our study, evidence of sobriety reinforces the concept of 
“second chances,” which is a consistent theme among employers who are 
willing to hire applicants with criminal records (Pager, Western, & Sugie, 
2009).  Although we expect that employers are more averse to applicants 
with criminal records for violent and property offenses, independent of actual
conduct, this would be a fruitful research area.  
The study was also designed in such a way that criminal justice 
information was signaled in addition to direct statements about drug use 
(and not in lieu of such statements).  Consequently, one possible 
interpretation of increasing aversion to applicants with drug use, arrests, and
convictions is that it reflects additional and cumulative signals of prohibited 
conduct.  Although this explanation aligns with the main findings, it is not 
clear why positions involving manual labor would deviate from the pattern of 
increasing aversion.  
It is also possible that employers in different cities or regions, such as 
those with higher proportions of job seekers with criminal records, tighter 
labor markets, or Ban the Box laws would be less averse to hiring those with 
records (e.g., Lahey & Beasley, 2018; Tilcsik, 2011).  We were unable to look 
at these distinctions with our data. Differences by Ban the Box laws, in 
particular, raise additional questions about how employers perceive and 
manage potentially competing legal constraints such as Ban the Box laws 
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and negligent hiring liability.  Just as job seekers with criminal records face a 
legal “double-bind” when trying to find work and comply with supervision 
requirements  (Augustine, 2019), employers encounter laws that present 
seemingly conflicting objectives. 
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We focused on repetition risk as a potential mechanism for aversion 
because of its prominence in current policy debates about criminal record 
screening.  For example, the view that repetition risk drives criminal record 
screening, combined with evidence that employers turn to statistical 
discrimination based on race and other illegal characteristics in the absence 
of screens, underwrites sympathy for employer screening and skepticism 
about restrictions like Ban the Box. If people with records face barriers to 
employment because employers correctly perceive that hiring them exposes 
their firms to costly risks, then the better way to lower those barriers may be
to reduce employer costs rather than require employers to bear these risks. 
Such alternatives include information strategies that enable cheaper sorting 
of workers into those who do and do not carry repetition risk, offsetting 
interventions like training or work experience that make jobseekers with 
records more valuable on net, and subsidy strategies that shift to the public 
any incremental costs of hiring people with records (Doleac, 2016; Jacobs, 
2015b; Strahilevitz, 2008; Williams, 2007). Proponents argue that such 
interventions may be more effective at changing employer behavior, fairer to
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employers whose aversion is seen as legitimate, and less likely to trigger the
perverse consequences of statistical discrimination.  
However, our findings indicate that aversion is not exclusively driven 
by repetition risk but also reflects stigma resulting from criminal justice 
contact. Consequently, permitting decision makers unrestricted access to 
records opens the door to forms of exclusion that are based, even if partly, 
on stigma and stereotypes generated by the criminal justice system. In this 
case, the natural legal response is to attempt to sort employers into those 
that screen for more versus less appropriate reasons, allowing the former 
but prohibiting the latter. That is precisely what the “nexus” rules of Fair 
Chance hiring and antidiscrimination laws attempt to do. For instance, the 
most stringent Fair Chance laws allow employers to screen for records only 
after a conditional offer is made.  If an employer subsequently decides to 
retract the offer, it must connect the prior conduct from the record to the 
instrumental concerns of the specific job position, and also must consider 
evidence of rehabilitation that makes re-offending (repetition) unlikely. In 
this way, Fair Chance permits screening to the extent it addresses repetition 
risk while prohibiting unrestrained access to records that opens the door to 
decision-making driven by stigma.
Because criminal justice contact disproportionately impacts groups 
with already low social status (e.g., who are poor, who are racial/ethnic 
minorities, who live in areas of concentrated disadvantage), unfettered 
access to criminal records—among employers as well as other decision 
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makers, such as landlords and colleges—may exacerbate long-term 
joblessness, low earnings, housing instability, and other inequalities 
(Desmond, 2016; Lageson, 2016; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010; Western, 2002). 
Policy responses driven by deference to employers’ legitimate need to find 
trustworthy, productive workers should consider evidence that employer 
aversion also reflects other mechanisms, including stigma resulting from the 
criminal record itself and not simply the underlying conduct.
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Notes: in Panel A, all differences are statistically significant (p-value <0.05) with the 
exception of the “late or absent” and “inappropriate language” attribute differences 
for the applicant with drug use.  In Panel B, differences for attributes “late or absent” 
and “inappropriate language” are significant (p-value <0.05) for the applicant with 
arrest, and differences for all attributes are significant for the applicant with 
conviction, except for “team player,” “follow rules,” and “hard worker.” 
Figure 1. Difference between Experimental Groups and Control (A) 
and Drug Use (B), by Attributes
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Table 1. Respondent and Firm Characteristics
  %/Median
Respondent Characteristics
Male 59.80%
Race/Ethnicity (non-exclusive)
White 89.17%
Black 2.88%
Hispanic 3.89%
Asian 4.32%
Other 1.40%
Education
High School or Less 4.79%
Some College 18.40%
College 76.73%
Age, in years (median category) 46-50
Tenure in Hiring Positions, in years (median
category) 6-10
Firm Characteristics
Industry
Finance and Professional 27.70%
Labor 21.57%
Sales 14.09%
Service 22.00%
Other 14.59%
Type
For-profit 82.17%
Governmental 4.53%
Non-profit 13.30%
Location Breadth
1 State 75.16%
2-5 States 19.47%
More than 6 States 5.37%
Policy about Conviction
No Policy 48.15%
HR 27.79%
Immediate Disqualification 24.06%
Respondent is Legally Prohibited from Hiring 
Applicant 12.38%
Notes: Sample size for each characteristic ranges from 2,702
to 2841, due to missing data on select variables. 
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Table 2. The Effect of Drug Use, Arrest, and Conviction for Employer Evaluations
Experimental Condition
Control Drug Use Arrest Conviction
  Mean   Mean (a)   Mean (a)
(b
)   Mean (a) (b)
(c
)
Attribute Scale 4.74 4.52 *** 4.44 *** 4.36 *** *** *
(.80) (.77) (.77) (.79)
Likely to Hire 3.69 3.37 *** 3.26 *** 3.19 *** *
(1.61) (1.72) (1.78) (1.80)
N (Respondents) 628   743     737       733      
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. For scale of attributes and likely to hire, 
larger values indicate more positive evaluations. Significance tests compare the 
coefficient to (a) control, (b) drug use, and (c ) arrest. Tests for scale of attributes are 
two sample t tests. Tests for likely to hire are ologit regression models that cluster 
respondents. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-
tailed tests)
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Table 3. Regression Models of Employer Evaluations, Adjusting for 
Future Drug Use
Model 1 Model 2
Unadjusted
With Future Drug
Use
  Coef.     Coef.  
A. Attribute Scale
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.22 *** -.12 ***
(.04) (.03)
Arrest -.29 *** -.15 ***
(.04) (.03)
Conviction -.38 ***ab -.22 ***ab
(.04) (.03)
Future Drug Use -.31 ***
(.01)
B. Likely to Hire 
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.32 *** -.31 ***
(.08) (.08)
Arrest -.42 *** -.39 ***
(.08) (.08)
Conviction -.49 ***a -.46 ***
(.08) (.08)
Future Drug Use -.06
(.03)
N (Respondents) 2841   2841
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Scale of attributes coefficients are 
estimated using linear regression models with robust standard errors.  Likely 
to hire coefficients are estimated using ologit regression models with 
clustered standard errors for multiple observations within respondents 
(N=7,494 to 8,523). Coefficients are significantly different from (a) drug use 
and (b) arrest. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-
tailed tests)
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Table 4. The Effect of Drug Use, Arrest, and Conviction for Likely to Hire Evaluations, by 
Position Type
Experimental Condition
Control Drug Use Arrest Conviction
  Mean   Mean (a)   Mean (a)
(b
)   Mean (a)
(b
)
(c
)
Customer Contact 3.60 3.25 *** 3.14 *** 3.01 *** **
(1.56) (1.70) (1.74) (1.79)
Office 3.52 3.24 ** 3.03 *** * 3.01 *** *
(1.65) (1.75) (1.81) (1.84)
Labor 3.95 3.61 *** 3.62 *** 3.55 ***
(1.59) (1.69) (1.72) (1.73)
N (Respondents) 628   743     737       733      
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Larger values indicate more positive 
evaluations. Significance tests compare the coefficient to (a) control, (b) drug use, and 
(c ) arrest. Tests are based on ologit regression models.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-
tailed tests)
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 Table 5. Regression Models of Employer Evaluations, with Firm-
Level Policies and Legal Prohibitions
Model 1 Model 2
With Firm-Level
Policies for
Conviction
Respondents
Without Legal
Prohibitions
  Coef.     Coef.    
A. Attribute Scale
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.22 *** -.25 ***
(.04) (.04)
Arrest -.29 *** -.33 ***a
(.04) (.04)
Conviction -.39 ***ab -.38 ***a
(.04) (.05)
Policy about Conviction (ref = no 
policy)
HR .08 *
(.04)
Immediate Disqualification -.14 ***
(.04)
B. Likely to Hire - Customer 
Contact
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.36 *** -.42 ***
(.09) (.10)
Arrest -.44 *** -.56 ***
(.09) (.10)
Conviction -.61 ***a -.60 ***
(.10) (.10)
Policy about Conviction (ref = no 
policy)
HR .30 ***
(.08)
Immediate Disqualification .07
(.11)
C. Likely to Hire - Office
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.27 ** -.29 **
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(.09) (.10)
Arrest -.43 *** -.52 ***a
(.10) (.10)
Conviction -.50 ***a -.45 ***
(.10) (.10)
Policy about Conviction (ref = no 
policy)
HR .25 ***
(.08)
Immediate Disqualification .22 *
(.11)
D. Likely to Hire - Labor
Experimental Manipulation (ref = 
control)
Drug Use -.42 *** -.40 ***
(.10) (.10)
Arrest -.37 *** -.36 ***
(.10) (.10)
Conviction -.46 *** -.37 ***
(.10) (.10)
Policy about Conviction (ref = no 
policy)
HR .11
(.08)
Immediate Disqualification -.03
(.10)
N (Respondents) 2702   2498  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Scale of attributes coefficients are 
estimated using linear regression models with robust standard errors. Likely to 
hire coefficients are estimated using ologit regression models with robust 
standard errors.  Coefficients are significantly different from (a) drug use and (b)
arrest. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-
tailed tests)
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Appendix. Materials for Applicant with a Conviction
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